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**Primarna in sekundarna perspektiva
vrednotenja politik /
Primary and secondary perspective in policy
evaluation**

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Primarna in sekundarna perspektiva vrednotenja politik / Primary and secondary perspective in policy evaluation

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Primarna in sekundarna perspektiva vrednotenja politik

Sklepno poglavje knjige 'Vrednotenje politik' (Radej B., M. Golobič, M. Macur, S. Dragoš, September 2011 (v tisku), Ljubljana: Vega, 248 str.)

Povzetek: Spoznanje, da je družba postala kompleksna, pomeni, da resnica o družbenih zadevah, kot o tem kaj je skupno dobro ali kako uspešno je njegovo doseganje, ni več ena sama, tista na oblasti ampak o pomembnih stvareh obstaja več dobro utemeljenih in enako veljavnih resnic. Zadeve iz domene javnega upravljanja so kompleksne, zato različni pogledi nimajo skupnega imenovalca, zato jih je treba obravnavati kot nesomerne, oziroma globoke in nepremostljive. Družbene pojave je zato treba proučiti v zlatem rezu njihove dvojnosti, razpenjajoči se med razlago primarnih pomenov, ki so za sistem konstitutivni, vendar na nesomeren in razdvajajoč način, in razlago sekundarnih pomenov, ki edini podajo celovit pogled na vrednoteni pojav, vendar le v vsebinah, ki za nikogar niso bistvene.

Ključne besede: javno upravljanje, vrednotenje, kompleksnost, nesomernost.

Spoznanje, da je družba postala kompleksna, pomeni, da resnica o družbenih zadevah, kot o tem kaj je skupno dobro ali o tem kaj naj bodo prednostne naloge javnih politik in kako uspešno jih dosegajo, ni več ena sama, tista na oblasti ampak o pomembnih stvareh obstaja več dobro utemeljenih in enako veljavnih resnic. Družba je v razumevanju same sebe, v ocenah svojega stanja in perspektiv razpadla na nekompatibilne poglede svojih avtonomnih pod-sistemov. Zahteve po avtonomiji so proizvod naraščanja medsebojne soodvisnosti kot zaradi tržne liberalizacije in tehnoloških sprememb, ki ogroža družbeno različnost. Z novoosvojeno avtonomijo na ravni pod-sistemov so politične skupnosti v svojem centru razpadle in kot celote ne znajo več razmišljati celostno in tako razkrojene ne zmorejo doseči soglasja o skupno pomembnih stvareh. Na to brezizhodnost se odziva umevanje, da narava resnice o družbenih dejstvih ni več enovita ampak je postala kompleksna. Potrebna je drugačna doktrina javnega upravljanja in vrednotenja njegovih učinkov, ki bo zagotavljala družbeno enovitost in hkrati ohranjala izhodiščno družbeno različnost.

Ugotavljanje resnice o družbenih zadevah se odvija globoko v senci naših vnaprejšnjih predstav o njeni naravi. Tem bolj, ker družba ni inertni objekt narave ampak je politični konstrukt. Povezava med izhodiščnimi predstavami o tem kakšna je narava družbene realnosti na eni strani in ugotovitvami resničnega stanja stvari na drugi je pri raziskovanju in posebej pri vrednotenju družbenih pojavov pogosto prezrta, ni pa nikoli odsotna. Način razmišljanja o družbenih zadevah je danes poenostavljen, ker je priklenjen na predpostavko, da je narava resnice enostavna, torej da je enovita in objektivno spoznavna po enem in istem znanstvenem

postopku, najprej z redukcijo objektov proučevanja na elementarne zadeve in nato z determinističnim ugotavljanjem njihovih enosmernih vzročno-posledičnih povezav. Takšna je podlaga razmišljanja, ki jo uporabljata najbolj konzervativni instituciji sodobnih družb, država in trg. A njuno v družbeno normo povzdignjeno enoumje proizvaja etično pristranske rezultate in zatira razvoj različnosti, ki je preživetveni pogoj porajajoče se družbene kompleksnosti.

Politika, pod tem pojmom zajamemo aktivnosti, ki spremljajo pripravo predpisov, proračunov, programov in planov, se posedujoč relikvije konvencionalne oz. »normalne znanosti« (Ravetz, 1999) oklepa prepričanja, da je cilje splošnega napredka in notranjo povezanost skupnosti mogoče uresničiti zgolj po njeni lastni podobi. To seveda pomeni z uporabo klasičnega znanstvenega postopka enostavnega analitičnega zaznavanja problemov, na osnovi katerega so pripravljene dobro pretehtani politični načrti, ki jih je treba v skupno dobro le dosledno uresničiti. Tak, za današnje razmere naiven recept je dokaj dobro deloval dokler se niso tako spremenile razmere. Doslej uveljavljene upravljavske in evalvacijske prakse torej niso nujno nezadostne, ker bi bile same po sebi slabe za namene, ki so jim prvotno bile namenjene.

Zdaj prevladujoča doktrina javnega upravljanja je bila razvita v zasebnem sektorju za povsem drugačne in predvsem enostavnejše izzive, kot jim je izpostavljeno javno upravljanje. Zasebni sektor zasleduje samo en glavni cilj, ki so mu vsi drugi podrejeni. Javni sektor pa ima več enako pomembnih glavnih ciljev, ki so v medsebojnem sporu, ker jih ne vrednotimo enotno v istem okviru racionalnosti ampak je teh okvirov več in so med sabo nepremostljivi. Od tod sledi tudi trditev, da je doseganje ciljev v zasebnem sektorju načeloma enostavno, v javnem pa kompleksno. Posledica obravnave izzivov javnih politik z izhodišč, ki jih narekuje iz zasebnega sektorja uvožena upravljavska doktrina, je njihovo popačenje. Ker vlade s svojim delovanjem obravnavajo popačene javne probleme namesto resničnih, so njihovi ukrepi marsikdaj škodljivi in sami postajajo vir težav, ko vse več vitalne energije družbe porabi država za vzdrževanje sebe in svoje ozke, s kompleksno naravo družbene realnosti skregane miselnosti.

Z uvoženo upravljavsko miselnostjo zaslepljena doktrina javnega upravljanja vpliva na kakovost vrednotenja učinkov politik, ki je integralna sestavina njihovega »ciklusa« in se tako neizbežno odvija globoko v senci te doktrinarne mentalitete, zato je vseskozi tudi vrednotenje politik samo oslepljeno s poenostavljeno zoženim načinom razmišljanja. Tako bi bilo treba družbene dileme in sploh vse zadeve iz domene javnega upravljanja za začetek najprej pravilno zastaviti. V našem primeru to pomeni, da jih je treba opredeliti kot *kompleksne*.

Horizontalna kompleksnost se tiče tega, da imajo družbeni akterji legitimne, vendar na moč različne vizije o tem kaj je dobro za skupnost kot celoto. Primer je nasprotje med gospodarskimi, socialnimi ali ekološkimi vizijami družbenega napredka. Vertikalna os kompleksnosti pomeni, da tudi med kolektivnim in individualnim nivojem presoje o družbenih zadevah obstaja prepada, ki razveljavlja vsak poskus ugotavljanja družbenih pomenov s seštevanjem lastnosti individualnih pomenov, kot tudi vsak obraten poskus umevati težnje posameznikov z dezagregiranjem makroskopsko pridobljenih opažanj. Nasprotno, osvojiti je treba več-nivojsko razumevanje javnih zadev, kar pomeni, da bi jih morali vrednotiti tako na mikro ravni oziroma lokalno kot na makro ravni oziroma strateško, pridobljene ugotovitve so enako veljavne vendar medsebojno nasprotujoče. Horizontalno in vertikalno izražene razlike so nepremostljive, ker so izražene kot opredelitev njihovih nosilcev do nečesa, kar ima zanje univerzalen pomen. Zato različni pogledi ne morejo imeti skupnega imenovalca, zato jih je treba obravnavati kot *nesomerne*, oziroma globoke in nepremostljive.

Nesomernost se nanaša na relacijo, ki se ne tiče le tega, kar je res ampak ima zveze tudi z ugotavljanjem dobrega. V družbenih zadevah sta resnica in dobro prepletene. Za urejanje družbenih zadev je nedvomno pomembno vedeti, kaj je »res«, da se ubranimo zablod, pomembno je upoštevati tudi, kar je »prav« oziroma v skladu s predpisi, saj družba obstaja s pogodbo med njenimi člani, ki uokvirja njeno notranjo stvarnost. Nazadnje je za urejanje družbenih zadev pomembno tudi kaj je »dobro«, ker je uresničevanje dobrega najvišji smisel življenja. Čeprav so prepleteni so na polju globokih družbenih opozicij izzivi za iskalca resnice, pravice in dobrega neprimerljivo drugačni. Znanstvenik je tako obsojen na življenje v neodpravljenem pomanjkanju svoje vednosti o objektih realnosti. Iskalec resnice živi v svetu pomanjkanja, iskalec skupnega dobra pa nasprotno živi v svetu družbene kompleksnosti, ki mu vladajo pravila obilja – obilja prizadevanj za skupno dobro, obilja sočasno veljavnih resnic in pluralnih vrednot. In kar je potem v družbi prepoznano kot resnično, ni nujno tudi prav in dobro. Kot na primer takrat, ko je eksistenčni minimum dohodka (vidik resnice) določen pod mejo revščine (normativni vidik), kar v skupnosti reproducira materialne pogoje bednega življenja (vidik dobrega). Tako sta v rokah nosilcev javnih politik resnica in pravica včasih naravnana proti temu, kar v družbi prepoznavamo kot pogoje vzdrževanja skupnega dobra. Skupno dobro je šele ekstrakt tega, kar je res in prav, zato jih moramo, ugnezdene drug v drugega obravnavati v ustreznem zaporedju. Resnica in pravila pri razlagi družbenih zadev podajo le okvir obravnave, ki ga pomensko napolni šele nepristransko ovrednotenje zadev z vseh nesomernih vidikov. Proizvodi znanost in prava so torej predhodni kompleksnem vrednotenju družbenih zadev in so le njegova nepogrešljiva orodja.

Prehod od poenostavljene h kompleksni praksi javnega upravljanja, se ne more zgoditi načrtno, ampak je lahko samo spontan. Zagotoviti je treba, da bodo kompleksne javne zadeve obravnavane na kompleksen način. To bo možno takoj, ko bodo v javni areni k besedi pripuščeni vsi legitimni, četudi globoko nasprotujoči pogledi. Šele s sodelovanjem raznorodnih javnosti se družbene dileme v javnem upravljanju zastavijo takšne, kakršne so res, torej kot kompleksne. V tem primeru sodelovanje javnosti, poudarimo, ni več pomembno (le) za podeljevanje legitimnosti odgovornim pri njihovem samostojnem sprejemanju odločitev, ampak je predvsem pogoj, da so lahko javne zadeve sploh pravilno razumljene. Ustrezen odziv odgovornih v javnem upravljanju na kompleksnost javnih dilem je torej najprej zagotoviti *povečanje, ne zmanjšanje kompleksnosti* javnega upravljanja.

Takoj se vprašamo, kako potem praktično obvladati naraščajočo kompleksnost javnega upravljanja. A to je kot zgolj izvedbeno vprašanje, drugotnega pomena. Zmožljivosti našega dojetja zapletene realnosti so seveda omejene. Zmožljivosti javnega upravljanja pa tudi, zato je treba kompleksne javne probleme vendarle poenostaviti, da se sploh zmoremo ukvarjati z njimi. Ključno pri tem pa je, *da so kompleksne zadeve poenostavljene na kompleksen način, ne da so obravnavane, kot da bi v svojem bistvu bile enostavne.*

Uporaben primer za ponazoritev pomena te razlike je reševanje agregacijskega problema, ki se nanaša na težavnost sinteze fragmentarne evidence, zbrane v analizi nekega kompleksnega družbenega pojava za potrebe njegovega celovitega ovrednotenja. Prevladujoči pristopi k vrednotenju se sintezi gradiva bodisi povsem izognejo in svoje ugotovitve podajo le s pomočjo deskriptivne razlage fragmentarne evidence ali pa se zanašajo na drugo skrajnost, da vso zbrano evidenco vržejo v en koš in vso zbrano raznorodno gradivo o proučevanem kompleksnem pojavu prevedejo na skupni imenovalac, izražen bodisi v denarju, koristnosti, sreči ali celo v neimenovanih številih. Za način sinteze, ki zahteva najprej določiti enotni skupni imenovalac lahko rečemo, da je enostaven in ne upošteva kompleksne narave družbenih pojavov, ki je ravno v tem, da enotni skupni imenovalac zanje ne obstaja.

Tako se je metodologom družbenega raziskovanja treba vprašati, za vrednotenje politik je to eno ključnih vprašanj, kako sploh opraviti agregacijo mnogovrstnega gradiva z namenom njegove sinteze tako, da bo na višji pomenski ravni množica nepomembnih podrobnosti odmišljena, ohranjene pa bodo ostale vse ključne distinkcije in ločeno izražene vse nesomerne pomenske razlike, ki družbene pojave delajo kompleksne. *Benthamova* zahteva (1789 v svojem temeljnem delu *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*) naj si politiki prizadevajo za maksimiranje sreče za vse in vsakogar, ni uresničljiva, če je mišljena na enem in istem ter za vse enako veljavnem skupnem imenovalcu sestavin sreče. Ker ima

javno upravljanje v resnici opravka z več enako veljavnimi, a načeloma kontradiktornimi izhodišči presoje njegove uspešnosti, je sintezo ocenjenih posamičnih prispevkov ukrepov k blaginji mogoče opraviti le delno in ločeno, samo za vsak vidik presoje posebej. Možno je opraviti le parcialno sintezo evalvacijskega gradiva s pomočjo ločenih in nekompatibilnih skupnih imenovalcev, ker le to omogoča pri sintezi ločeno prikazati že izhodiščno nesomerno izražene razlike v zvezi z doseganjem ali uživanjem »sreče«. To seveda še ne reši agregacijskega problema, ampak ga le pravilno zastavi, ko zagotovi, da bodo s sintezo vrednotne razlike obravnavane ločeno. Sinteza »po kosih« je samo delna in opravljena le do te mere, da se izoblikujejo tri glavne opozicije do družbene zadeve, ki je predmet spoznavanja, odločanja ali konkretno vrednotenja (ravno tri zato, da ostane kompleksnost zadeve ponazorjena kar se da poenostavljeno). Ko so tako v horizontalni dimenziji kompleksnosti identificirane glavne osi opozicij do vrednotene zadeve, so ocenjeni vplivi ukrepov s tem obenom že zarisani v navzkrižnih relacijah Leontjeve input-output matrike, ki pokažejo, kako posamezne skupine ukrepov vplivajo na področja zanimanja ali delovanja drugih skupin ukrepov in obratno. Skozi takšno mrežno oz. matrično organizacijo ocenjenih opozicijskih relacij se na nediagonalnih poljih matrike izluščijo sekundarne (navzkrižne) povezave med učinki ukrepov in šele te so podlaga končne sinteze evalvacijskega gradiva, ki pa ni več aditivna (kot v prvem koraku) ampak je korelativna oziroma presečna. Možna je le zato, ker tisto, kar je njen predmet ni izraženo kategorično enoumno ampak vsebuje elemente vsaj dveh kategoričnih opredelitev. V drugem koraku se torej tisto, *kar o obravnavani javni dilemi lahko povemo sintezno, torej celostno, porodi kot plod vrednotenj zadev, ki za nikogar izmed vpletenih v tri temeljne opozicije niso bistvene*, saj se nanašajo na vprašanja, ki so za vse sodelujoče sekundarnega pomena.

Rezultat prvega koraka evalvacijske sinteze s parcialno agregacijo je ocena vplivov ukrepov vrednotene politike na vse različne izraze tega, kar se smatra kot dobro, rezultat drugega koraka pa je drugačen. Z njim se oceni povezanost med izhodiščno diferenciranimi vidiki vrednotenja. Sintezno poenostavljanje kompleksnosti je razmeroma preprost postopek, opravljen po poti dvostopenjske metodologije. Takšen postopek je uporaben, ker zmore iz kontradiktornih izhodišč proizvesti kohezivne pomene na višji ravni veljavnosti, zato je pomemben za vrednotenje na globokih razlikah vrednot utemeljenih kompleksnih družbenih zadev.

Za končno oceno vrednotenja učinkov politike razlago je pomemben predvsem drugi korak sinteze, ki v ospredje postavi sekundarne učinke politik na »druge«. V šele porajajočih se pristopih k vrednotenju perspektiva drugega postaja vodilo ocenjevanja učinkov politik. To

pomeni zahtevo po spoznavanju družbe *prek drugih, ki izhajajo iz drugačnih okvirov razlage realnosti*. To pa je naš prvi razlog, ki utemelji zakaj je vrednotenje učinkov politik smiselno in logično problematizirati ravno s stališča širše javnosti kot orodja za krepitev »sociabilnosti splošne javnosti« (s parafrazo na Rusovo »sociabilnost države«) in zlasti vseh tistih, ki se za vrednotenje politik zanimajo le postransko, ko se s tem srečujejo občasno pri zasledovanj nekih drugih hotenj.

Odkritje ključnosti pomena sekundarnih pojavov za celostno razlago kompleksnih družbenih zadev sicer odločno prehitveva ambicije prevladujočih praks vrednotenja, a na tem mestu seveda ni izvorno. Že Demsetz (1969, v Schnellenbach, 2005) trdi, da mora biti takrat, kadar ne moremo opredeliti optimalnega vladnega ravnanja, merilo ocenjevanja posameznega vladnega ukrepa drug vladni ukrep, njuna skladnost ali sinergija, ne stanje nirvane, ki ga predpostavlja načrt konkretnega ukrepa. S stališča celotne družbe v normalnih razmerah nobena politika ne more biti primarna za vse ampak vsakič le za manjšino – za konkretnega odgovornega nosilca ukrepa in za tiste, na katere neposredno učinkuje. Na ravni družbe kot celote pa velika večina populacije veliko večino učinkov vseh politik občuti le v obliki posrednih oziroma sekundarnih učinkov. Zato bolj ko družbe postajajo kompleksne, bolj morajo nosilci politik poleg skrbi za uresničevanje svojih primarnih ciljev upoštevati še posledice teh prizadevanj za 'druge' in njihove možnosti uresničevanja njihovih primarnih hotenj, ki so nemalokrat nasprotna primarnim hotenjem 'prvih'. Tako je ravno razlikovanje med primarnimi in sekundarnimi vsebinami pogoj nepopačene razlage kompleksnega družbenega pojava tako, da se na eni strani ohranja izhodiščna razklanost temeljnih vrednot in na drugi zagotavlja celosten pogled, ki je v tem primeru potem lahko zgrajen le heterogeno.

Pomen sekundarnega učinkovanja za razlago družbenih procesov je bil docela razviden že davno Adamu Smithu (1723-1790), ki to izrazi s konceptom skrite roke trga, ki tržne procese ureja za našimi hrbti, ne da bi si kdo za to posebej načrtno prizadeval. Tudi v Hayekovi teoriji spontanega razširjanja reda in pri ekonomskih evolucionistih nasploh (Veblen, Schumpeter, Dopfer...) so sekundarne interakcije ključne za pojasnjevanje kompleksnih družbenih procesov. Vir reda pri Hayeku je posledica ovrednotenja tihega znanja, ki je za posameznike samo po sebi neuporabno in dobi smisel šele v interakciji z drugimi. Že mnogo pred njim je škotski filozof David Hume (1711-1776) zapisal, da tisto, kar lahko šteje kot javna korist, ni proizvod racionalnega računa, blaginja skupnosti tako ni dosežena s prebujenjem strasti do ustvarjanja javnih dobrin, ampak posredno, s prebujenjem strasti posameznikov do podjetnosti, umetnosti in ugodja (v Barry, 1982). Hayek pravi, da so naše namere in naša dejanja eno, njihov širši učinek pa nekaj povsem drugega. Javna blaginja in skupno dobro ni

neposredna materializacija naporov politikov, to prepričanje je le sad njihove »usodne domišljivosti« (Hayek, 1992). Blaginja je zgolj koincidenca učinkov, ki so kombinirana posledica delovanj in nedelovanj vlade in vseh ostalih, ki na to vplivajo. Če bi ljudje počeli zgolj to, kar mislijo, da počno, bi ne potrebovali družbene znanosti, saj bi za poznavanje družbenih procesov zadoščalo že razkritje hotenj posameznikov. Zato so za Hayeka in Popperja nehotene posledice delovanja osnovni predmet zanimanja družbenih znanosti in še več, so pogoj za samo možnost znanstvenega razumevanja družbe in motor družbene evolucije (Vernon, 1976). Kar se za neko vednost zdi zunanje, torej drugotnega pomena (namreč vpliv na druge), se ob konkretnjši analizi pokaže kot ključna točka, ki se drži bistva samega (Althusser, v Levačić, 2009).

Zaradi razvidnega prekrivanja dveh razlag pomena sekundarnih procesov ali pomenov, evolutivne in kompleksne, je treba takoj poudariti tudi pomembno razliko. Evolutivne razlage, so v celoti pojasnjene s sekundarnimi procesi, to pa ni zadostno za razlago družbene kompleksnosti. Slednja zahteva nekaj bistveno več. Redukcija razlage družbenih zadev le na sekundarne pomene ni zadostna, in da bi se tega spomnili, se moramo vrniti na začetek, k spoznanju, da družbena kompleksnost vendarle temelji na nepremostljivih razlikah, ki jih ustvarjajo kategorialno izražene nesomerne opredelitve. To klasični evolucionisti v posploševanju pomena posrednih učinkov in z zavračanjem pomena načrtnih prizadevanj osebkov družbene evolucije v zvezi z njihovo kolektivno usodo kar odmislijo. Razlaga je nezadostna, ker družbenih procesov ni mogoče pojasniti brez upoštevanja izrazitih diskontinuitet, nepremostljivih prepado, ki jih povzročata nesomernost vrednot, ker družba ni samostan, spokojen kraj, iz katerega so izgnane vse velike dileme in globoka nasprotja. Prav nasprotno. Po mnenju systemskega teoretika in Nobelovca Herberta Simona (1969) družb brez globokih nasprotij, ki so, kakršna so, nedvomno načrtna in zavestna, ne naravno nujna niti spontana, ne bi bilo, vsaj ne na tako visoki ravni kompleksnosti kot obstajajo danes, če se navznoter ne bi organizirale kot diskontinuitete avtonomnih pod-sistemov, povezanih zgolj z obrobniimi preseki.

Kot je za razmere družbene kompleksnosti pokazal primer dvostopenjskega reševanja agregacijskega problema pri vrednotenju politik, mora razlaga kompleksnega družbenega pojava enako resno upoštevati tako *veliko število majhnih ujemanj (sekundarni vidik)*, kot *majhno število velikih nasprotij (primarni vidik)*, da lahko kompleksen pojav obravnava nepopačeno. Spoznanje, da je treba družbene pojave obravnavati kompleksno, preprosto pomeni, da jih je treba poenostavljati v zlatem rezu njihove dvojnosti, razpenjajoči se *med razlago primarnih pomenov, ki so za sistem konstitutivni, vendar na nesomeren in s tem le na*

globoko razdvajajoč način, in razlago sekundarnih pomenov, ki edini presečno omogočajo celovit pogled na vrednoteni pojav, vendar le v vsebinah, ki za nikogar niso bistvene. Primarne vsebine so potem kot neke vrste stebri, ki razlago kompleksnega družbenega pojava, vzemimo vrednoteno politiko držijo pokonci (njeni smotri), a je ne integrirajo, medtem ko so presečne oz. sekundarne vsebine tiste, ki politiko držijo skupaj, ko njene sestavine povezujejo v horizontalni smeri.

Postavljanje teoretične zahteve neizključevanja drugih, oziroma ključnega pomena sekundarnih ugotovitev vrednotenja učinkov kompleksnih politik se ne zastavlja izolirano temveč dosledno v navezavi z načelom nesomernosti družbenih zadev. Primarno in sekundarno sta pri razlagi kompleksnih zadev nerazdvojno povezana. Ravno zato, ker smo se v kolektivnih zadevah nasproti drugim uzrli v perspektivi nesomernih avtonomij, moramo zdaj o kolektivnih zadevah presojati neizključevalno oziroma sredinsko s posredovanjem perspektiv »drugega«, če hočemo kot avtonomije še ostati dovolj trdno povezani v širšo skupnost kot je vzemimo narod. Razvoj družbene kompleksnosti je preprosto povezan s hkratnim napredkom medsebojne so-odvisnosti v vsebinah, ki so šibko povezane in neodvisnosti v vsebinah, ki se vzpostavijo le v načelnih zadevah kot močno in strogo povezane.

Javne zadeve je treba v razmerah družbene kompleksnosti obravnavati pluralno, kar konkretno pomeni tako s stališča šibkih ujemanj kot strogih nasprotij. Granovetter (1983) analogno gradi svojo teorijo na razliki med močnimi in šibkimi vezmi skupnosti. Zanj so šibke vezi temeljnega pomena za družbeno kohezijo v razmerah, ko je družba razklana v izhodišču. Če bi bile vse povezave v sistemu šibke, kot predvideva Hayekova teorija, bi bil sistem nestabilen, njegova identiteta pa nejasna. Če pa bi bile vse povezave v močne, kot v družini, v klubu, med prijatelji ali kot velja za vse druge primere, ko je neka skupnost utemeljena s sklicevanjem na isti skupni imenovalc (vero, nacionalnost, znanost, ideologijo), tedaj bi bila družba notranje popolnoma razklana in se nikoli ne bi zmoгла vzpostaviti kot koherenca. Kompleksno razumevanje družbenih pojavov torej ne zahteva opustiti primarne pomene v prid sekundarnim niti nasprotno, ampak zahteva pretehtati, kako povezano razložiti pojave s stališča močnih kot šibkih vezi, oziroma s stališča globokih opozicij in majhnih ujemanj.

Ta dvojnost na področju vrednotenja navaja na nivojsko ureditev sožitja med miselno perspektivo enostavnosti in kompleksnosti. Kompleksen način razmišljanja nikakor ne odpravi enostavnega načina mišljenja, ampak ga samo pooblasti za ukvarjanje z enostavnimi vprašanji. Ta se zastavljajo bodisi na mikroskopski ravni posamičnih zanimanj in empiričnih izkušenj bodisi, ločeno na makroskopski ravni sistema kot pomenske celote. Družbeni procesi

se odvijajo tako na mikro kot na makro ravni, toda opisi procesov na teh dveh ravneh niso neposredno povezljivi. Mikroskopske zadeve se razložijo mikroskopsko, makroskopske makroskopsko in v obeh primerih je uporabljen enovit, na nek način enostaven način razmišljanja. Oba (eno)nivojska vidika razlage družbenih zadev sta na svojem področju enako veljavna, povezano pa sta lahko razložena šele z neke tretje, vmesne oz. mezoskopske ravni (Dopfer in dr., 2004), ki ima lastnosti obeh. Mezo raven je tam, kjer empirično trči s konceptualnim in individualno s kolektivnim. Na mezo ravni se »poraja substrat družbenega« (Goldspink, 2000), tam delujejo institucije, na njej se porajajo politike in nenazadnje z nje sredinsko vrednotimo njihove učinke. O *eno-nivojsko izraženih, bodisi zasebnih in kolektivnih zadevah ni narobe razmišljati enostavno, v ekonomiji na primer keynesiansko ali neo-klasično, le medsebojne interakcije med ravnmi se morajo opraviti v sredinskem miselnem okviru več-nivojske kompleksnosti*. Ker se javna sfera odvija ravno na sredinski ravni sta za vodenje politik in javno upravljanje sredinsko izhodišče in kompleksna logika imperativna, če hočeta kdaj spet postati konsistentna in prispevna za širšo družbo ter njeno skupno dobro.

Tisti, ki vrednoti kompleksne družbene pojave uporablja sredinsko miselnost, ker ta najbolje ustreza naravi izziva. Sredinski pristop, ki ga zamejujeta perspektiva drugega in raznorodnost prizadevanj širše javnosti v zvezi z uveljavljanjem skupnega dobra, tvori konsistenten in logično skladen miselni okvir raziskovanja družbene kompleksnosti. Vrednotenje vzpostavlja »svojo« sredinsko miselnost in z njo razširja kognitivne sposobnosti družbe, da lahko drugače dojema, izmenjuje in pri delovanju bolje uporablja spoznanja o sami sebi, kot danes omogoča enostavno zamišljena doktrina novega javnega upravljanja Sredinsko, presečno, korelativno oziroma participativno vrednotenje se za spoznavanje kompleksne družbene realnosti ponuja za analogen namen kot ga opravlja klasična znanost za objektivno spoznavanje naravnih pojavov. Družbena realnost verjetno ni neka povsem druga realnost, kot jo zarisuje objektivno spoznanje, na vsak način pa je to višja ali ustvarjena, umetna realnost (ki ima kljub temu za njene prebivalce povsem konsekventne in realne posledice). In ravno zato, ker se vrednotenje zdaj vzpostavlja s svojim lastnim okvirom razmišljanja, ki je veljavnejši od dominantne doktrine novega javnega upravljanja in zaokrožen na višji ravni splošnosti, ki jo dokazuje njegova sredinska neizključevalnost, poslej vrednotenje ne more več ostati odvisno orodje politike, ampak ga je treba vzpostaviti kot od nje neodvisen okvir konstruiranja družbene realnosti s podlage prizadevanj za skupno dobro. Zato vrednotenje ne more več ostati razumljeno le kot korekcijski pripomoček politikam ampak se naj uveljavi neodvisno.

Družbena razklanost sredinsko gledano ni usodna za naše možnosti bolj celostnega razumevanja in trajnostnega usmerjanja družbenih pojavov, bolj povezanega javnega

upravljanja in za možnost kohezivne družbe. Razklanost ni nikakršna nesreča, ki bi prizadela post-moderno družbo ampak nasprotno je ravno dragocen dosežek napredka v razvoju avtonomije sestavnih delov skupnosti, ko se vse več članov zaznava soodgovornih za stanje in za prihodnost skupnosti. Razklanost je zgolj posledica tega, da na silnice poenotenja, ki jih v veliki meri sproža vsakovrstno povečevanje soodvisnosti, člani skupnosti odgovarjajo na svoje izvirne načine, vendar obenem predano neki viziji skupnega dobra. Če je rešitev za globoka nasprotja in trdovratne probleme v javni sferi sploh kakorkoli možna, potem nujno raste iz protislovij med vpletenimi, ki pa so se, izzvani z njimi, voljni učiti drug od drugega in posledično med sabo širiti presečna območja šibkih povezav, ki edina vodijo v sintezo na ravni skupnega. Prvi in nepogrešljiv pogoj za možnost prihodnje pluralno povezane skupnosti, ki bo navzven enotna in bo kljub temu navznoter reproducirala svojo radikalno različnost je torej nedvomno ohranjati *globoke družbene razlike in jih gojiti, namesto prizadevati za njihovo konsenzualno preseganje, kompromisno ublažitev ali kar neupoštevanje s pomočjo ignorance ali izključevanja.*

Današnji problemi javnega upravljanja so z vseh možnih strani zasidrani v preživetem načinu razmišljanja, ki ne zna konstruktivno zaposliti obilja prizadevanj za skupno dobro. Dejstvo, da je družba neizprosno kompleksna samo po sebi ne pomeni težave, ampak ravno nasprotno, odpira neslutene možnosti v obravnavi skupnih zadev iz domene javnega upravljanja. Gotovo s tem danes še nismo tako daleč, kot si želimo biti v svojih harmoničnih vizijah, na vsak način pa nepovraten korak naprej od razmer, ko je bila enotnost skupnosti pogoj njenega kohezivnega obstoja in prosperitete njenih članov. Ko pa bo enkrat pri upravljanju skupnega dobra uveljavljeno izhodišče kompleksnosti in na njem temelječa sredinska miselnost, bodo partikularni interesi stremeli, da svojo lastno prosperiteto čim bolj povežejo z uspešnostjo javnih projektov za skupno dobro; in nasprotno, doseganje splošnih ciljev javnih politik po stabilnosti in napredku bo postalo odvisno zlasti od uresničitve pretežnega dela registra partikularnih interesov. Tako res ne more več presenečati, da največ mešanih eko-socialnih, eko-poslovnih, socialno-podjetniških projektov, uspeva v okoljih, kjer so najbolj dosledno spoštovane kategorialne zahteve po svobodni zasebni pobudi, načela čistega in zdravega življenjskega okolja in kjer so obenem uveljavljeni visoki standardi socialne varnosti. Blaginja je sestavljena iz treh glavnih sestavin, ki morajo biti vse hkrati prisotne, da bi lahko govorili o blaginji, vendar pa ta ni celostna, pravična, trajnostna, dokler se tri sestavine blaginje preskrbujejo ločeno, namesto presečno. »Skandinavska formula« je priročen primer doseganja na prvi pogled nezdružljivega, ko uravnovešeno varovanje vseh glavnih principielnih razlik šele ustvarja ugodno okolje za razmah mešanih projektov, ki so za družbo kohezivni.

Vzdrževanje pluralne kohezije v multipolarni družbi ne bo odvisno od prizadevanj za doseg družbenega soglasja, niti presečnega ne (Rawlsov 'overlapping consensus'), ampak od sredinskega oz. 'neizključevalnega nestrinjanja'. Čeprav so razlike vrednot nepremostljive, na njih temelječa stališča drugo do drugega niso antagonistična, ampak le nesomerna. Zaradi nesomernosti nasprotja vidimo pluralno in agonistično, se pravi zgolj še kot izzivalna, ne pa več izključevalna nasprotja (Foucault, v Burchell in dr., 1991). Post-moderne vrednote po mnenju francoske filozofinje Chantal Mouffe nikoli ne bodo mogle razrešiti globokih družbenih konfliktov. A to po njenem ne pomeni, da ni mogoče poiskati skupnega okvira za njihovo obravnavo – skupnega na tak način, da bo okvir konstrukt tistih, ki jih to zadeva. Za oblikovanje takšnega okvira ni več mogoče prepričevati nasprotnikov v svoj prav, ampak ustvariti demokratično vzdušje, »katerega dosežek ni soglasje, ampak odnos« (Mouffe, 1999). Saj, kot pravi drugje, »glavna naloga demokracije ni doseči soglasje, ampak upravljati nesoglasja z medsebojnim upoštevanjem« (Mouffe, 2010). Naloga demokracije je ravno izgraditi zmogljivosti videti svet v perspektivi drugega (Ankersmit, 2005).

Uvajanje kompleksnosti kot novega načina obravnave družbenih zadev in torej nujno na podlagi nesomernosti vrednot, v družbeni areni na stežaj odpira vrata globokim nasprotjem, kar v prihodnje obeta znatno povečanje izražanja družbenih nasprotij. S pomembno razliko, poslej bodo v svoji pluralni sredinskosti globoka nasprotja izražena neprimerno bolj kultivirano in jih bo moč obravnavati v veliki meri le v okviru šibkih povezav. Mehak in neizključevalen pristop k obravnavi družbenih nasprotij bo okrepil socialni kapital sodelujočih in jim bo s kontekstom obilja razširil miselne horizonte. Razločitev primarnih od sekundarnih vsebin bo kanalizirala destruktivne silnice konflikta in jih pretvarjala v pozitivno energijo presečnega sodelovanja. Tako bo družba v prihodnje sicer res konfliktna vendar na bistveno drugačen, bolj konstruktiven, kultiviran in učljiv način. Ko bomo enkrat v družbena nasprotja potopljeni na kompleksen način, bo pogled nazaj, v našo sedanost verjetno razkril strašljivo podobo enoumja in zaslepljenosti, ki se ga zdaj niti ne zavedamo, niti še ne moremo zavedati, dokler si poslušno prizadevamo o svojih družbenih izbirah še naprej misliti s tujo glavo.

Primary and secondary perspective in policy evaluation

The concluding chapter of a book 'Policy Evaluation' (Radej B., M. Golobič, M. Macur. S. Dragoš, September 2011 (forthcoming), Ljubljana: Vega, 248 pp.)

Abstract: Recognising that the society has become complex, means that the truth about social issues such as about identification of public interest or common good is not a single one, but there are a variety of well-founded and equally valid truths. The public management is complex, therefore different views do not share common denominator, they should therefore be regarded as incommensurable. The social phenomena should be seen in their duality. The realization that social matter has to be evaluated in a complex way simply means that it has to be evaluated in the golden ratio of its duality, stretched between the explanation of its primary meanings - which are constitutive for it, but in an incommensurable and deeply dividing way - and the explanation of its secondary meanings that are the only ones that lead to a holistic view, but merely in contents that are not of primary importance to anyone.

Keywords: public management, valuation, complexity, incommensurability

To recognize the complexity of postmodern society means to be aware that there is no longer only one truth about vital social questions, such as what is a common good or how successfully public policies contribute to it. There are many well-founded and equally valid truths put forward by autonomous sub-systems of a society. Enhanced social groups' demands for autonomy are their reaction to an ever-increasing mutual dependence. It is induced by the megatrends of global market liberalization, technological changes that seem to jeopardize the possibility for preservation of societies' internal diversity and external distinctiveness. The newly established political autonomies have disintegrated the unified core of the contemporary society into a set of constitutive but contradicting core values. So decayed on the deep level, the society cannot reach an agreement on matters that are central to it as a whole; consequently, the society cannot act cohesively, and increasingly fails to produce consistent results. As the social reality has become complex, we need a complex understanding of public dilemmas, complex doctrines of public management and complex methods for the evaluation of its achievements. These novelties are needed to endow members of the disintegrating postmodern society with holistic views without simultaneously threatening the society's diversity on the deep level of its contradicting fundamentals.

The search for the truth about social matters is always conducted in the shadow of our assumptions about the nature of social truth and social reality itself. The society as an object of evaluation is not an inert and externally imposed object of nature. It is an endogenously or

internally constructed entity. The relationship between assumptions about the nature of social reality on one side, and findings about the real state of social matters on the other, is often overlooked in social research and evaluation, but it is never absent. Prevalent today is a simplified way of reasoning about social matters. It is based on the assumption that the nature of truth is simple, which means that the truth is uniformly and objectively recognizable by a single scientific procedure. Such a simplified approach reduces evaluated objects into their elemental parts – atoms, cells or individuals – which are then subjected to a detailed analysis with a view to identifying their deterministic regularities in a linear explanation of their causes and effects. That simple is the basis of thinking used by the two most conservative institutions of modern societies, the state and the market. Their single-mindedness is elevated into a social norm that is systematically reproducing ethically biased results and repressing the development of diversity which is a necessary condition for the preservation of social complexity.

Public policies – understood as activities that accompany the preparation of regulations, budgets, programs and plans – operate in accordance with the canons of conventional or ‘normal science’ (Ravetz, 1999). Enlightened policy-makers are clinging to the belief that the goals of social progress can only be achieved through the fulfilment of their own ideological agendas. Decision-makers first analytically define social problems applying scientific procedure; on the basis of obtained results political plans are designed which then only have to be consistently realized for the common good and in general public interest. This naive recipe had worked rather well before the global conditions changed. Present practices which are applying this recipe are therefore both insufficient and inappropriate for the fulfilment of their (over)simplified purpose.

The currently prevailing public management doctrine was developed in the private sector for dealing with completely different type of problems and only for accomplishing simple assignments, in a way. The profit-earning private sector has only one major goal to which all others are subordinate. The public sector, however, pursues many equally important major goals that are in mutual conflict because we do not evaluate them uniformly in the same frame of rationality, but within multiple mutually incommensurable and irreconcilable frames. This justifies the claim that, in principle, reaching goals in the private sector is simple, while in the public sector it is a complex task.

The simplified understanding of social matters in public domain is often dictated by the simplified public management doctrine – widely accepted since the eighties – which has been imported from the private sector. When applied in public sector, the private sector’s

perspective considerably deforms the perception of social matters. So government basically deals with social matters defined in a distorted, biased way. It deals with misrepresented social problems instead of with the authentic ones. As a result, policy-making is increasingly in conflict with the wider public perception of the social matters. Consequently government requests more and more vital energy from a society only to perpetuate itself and defend its narrowly defined public commitments. In this way governmental interventions become one of the major sources of social problems.

In the prevailing management doctrine, policy evaluation is one of four main modules of the policy cycle. The mainstream evaluation has been entirely subsumed within the same simplified and narrow doctrine of public management and it blindly proceeds in the shadow of the doctrine's distorted rationality. Therefore the first task one needs to accomplish in an effort to evaluate the social reality indiscriminately is to define social matters as intrinsically complex.

Complexity of social matters may be observed in policy-making and evaluation of its achievements along two main axes – horizontally and vertically (Geels, Kemp, 2007, Radej, 2010). Horizontal complexity relates to the fact that in a given society agents have legitimate, but very different visions of what is good for the community as a whole. An example of this is the disagreement between economical, social and ecological agendas of reproducing the common good. The vertical axis of complexity relates to micro-macro gap resulting from discontinuity between collective and individual levels of judgment about social matters. This gap nullifies every attempt at discovering collective meanings by adding together all the traits of individual events – as it is routinely practiced in economic accounting, assessments of public opinion and general statistics. Equally invalid is every attempt at explaining microscopic matters by disaggregation of macroscopic observations. A direct translation from micro to macro content is not feasible in social affairs (Dopfer, 2006). Instead, what is needed is multi-level reasoning (O'Neill, 1988). Public dilemmas should be evaluated in a micro or local perspective as well as in the macro or strategic perspective, as these two sets of findings are equally important, though often opposed. Horizontally and vertically uttered oppositions against a certain narrow interpretation of a given social dilemma are mutually incommensurable because they relate to judgments on major issues that have a universal meaning for social agents who pursue them. The unavoidable result is that social visions of different social agents need to be handled in a complex way as incommensurable or deeply confronted and irreconcilable.

Incommensurability refers to a relation which concerns not only the “true” and objectively real, but also various subjective rankings of “good”. Incommensurability is thus more a concept of evaluation than of science. This is important to acknowledge because in social affairs judgments based on norms, truths and goodness are often intertwined, but rarely in a harmonious way. The managing of social matters undoubtedly requires acknowledgment of ‘the truth’, so we can defend ourselves against delusions; delusions are not incommensurable to the truth, but remain its binary, exclusively antagonistic opposite; however, something which is seen as a delusion in one context may be the plain truth in another, so the exclusion of an alleged delusion is not an appropriate in every case. In social judgments we also have to consider what is right, i.e. in accordance with norms and regulations, because society exists due to a social contract between its members which frames its inner normative setting. Finally, to impartially comprehend social matters it is also important to know what is good because the realization of good is the highest meaning of life.

Although the challenges for the seekers of truth, justice and good in the complex field of deep social oppositions are intertwined, they are incomparably different. A scientist is convicted to a life of irrevocable scarcity and deprivation concerning his knowledge about the objects of reality. The seeker of truth lives in a world of scarcity, unlike the seeker of the common good, who lives in a world of social abundance – of various efforts aimed at the realisation of a common good, abundance of simultaneously valid truths and pluralist values. The rationality of those reasoning in the assumed context of scarcity is completely different from the rationality of those reasoning in the context of abundance. So the seekers of truth and the seekers of good do not comprehend social matters in the same way. The first must proceed by exclusion (of delusions or lies from truths), while the second must be inclusive for different concepts of good. Hence their the irreconcilable opposition.

Social complexity implies that the concepts of truth, right and good need to be distinguished in the reasoning about social matters. What is recognized as truth in a complex society is not necessarily also right and good. For instance, when an existential minimum of income (aspect of truth) is set by social policy below the agreed limit of poverty (normative aspect), this contributes to the reproduction of material conditions of miserable life in a community as a whole (aspect of good). In the hands of policy-makers, truth and justice are sometimes opposed to conditions that a society recognizes as necessary for the preservation of common good. Nevertheless, the common good can only be understood on the platform of that which is already confirmed as true and recognized as right. In the evaluation of social matters the social truths and social rules provide only a frame of reasoning. The frame itself does not

confer any meaning to social matters until it is evaluated from all incommensurable aspects of common good. Scientific and normative judgements precede all complex evaluation of social matters and are its indispensable tools.

Judgements about social matters are incommensurable and social incommensurability is basic characteristics of social complexity. As noted earlier, it should be ensured that complex public matters are dealt with in a complex way. This necessitates a shift from a simple to a complex approach to evaluation. The shift itself cannot be induced by decree or design, but can only emerge spontaneously. The precondition is that all legitimate views in the public domain, even those deeply contradictory, can have their say in definition, implementation and evaluation of the common good. Only through the participation of diverse publics are social dilemmas in public management adequately articulated – as characteristically incommensurable matters and thus complex. In this case the public participation is not important (only) for providing legitimacy to the elected decision-makers; agents' participation is now above all a necessary condition for an indiscriminate understanding of the complex nature of public matters. An appropriate response of those in charge to the management of social complexity is therefore to first assure a more complex reasoning about social matters.

The question that immediately arises is how decision-makers in public domain can control the increasing complexity of public management in practice. Our capacities to understand a complex reality are of course considerably constrained both by nature (limited cognitive capacities) and by social factors (imposed social constructs). To be able to deal with complex problems at all, we have to simplify them in some – usually very specific – way. However, this question, as a functional one, has only secondary importance. Primary important is to recognise that the response to this functional problem must insure that *complex matters are consistently recognised and simplified in a complex way, and not dealt with as intrinsically simple*.

A useful illustration of the implications of this methodological difference can be found in an attempt to resolve an aggregation problem in evaluation synthesis (Radej, 2011). Policy evaluation has been selected here as one of specific approaches to researching complex social matters. The aggregation problem concerns the difficulty of synthesizing the assessed fragmentary evidence of policy impacts on various criteria of evaluation into overall evaluative conclusions. The prevailing approaches tend to resolve the aggregation problem as if its nature were constructed as simple. Two practices are evident. The older approaches tend to avoid synthesis and present their findings only in the form of descriptive explanations of fragmented evaluation findings (such as Leopold et al, 1971). Or they turn to another extreme.

In that case, all the fragments are thrown into a single basket in which all the diverse findings are assumed to be intrinsically uniform and having a single common denominator (Ekins, Medhurst, 2003; Camagni, 2007). The denominator is expressed either in money, utility, happiness or even in abstract terms such as in index numbers. This kind of synthesis that first demands attributing a common denominator to its varied constituents and thus rests on assumption of commensurability of evaluation findings is designed as simple. It takes no account of the incommensurable nature of social judgments, i.e. of the fact that their common denominator does not exist. Thus Bentham's request – politicians should strive to achieve the greater good for the greatest number of people – cannot be applied in practice if it implies a single denominator of happiness.

Some academic scholars and methodologists of social research have already explored how to aggregate diverse analytical material in the conditions of system complexity (Simon, Ando, 1961; Foster, Potts, 2007; Veen, Otter, 2002, Elsnér, 2008). This is certainly one of the key methodological questions for policy evaluators. The synthesis of incommensurable evaluation findings should provide a higher level of meaning so that the unimportant detailed findings can be disregarded, while the key distinctions are kept intact and presented in aggregated results indiscriminately. Since a given policy affects wider society with diverse, equally valid but differently evaluated impacts, the evaluative synthesis can be, as Radej (2011) proposes, accomplished only partially and separately for each incommensurable aspect of judgment. Thus, incompatible common denominators are applied and so not only one, but several incompatible sub-aggregates are obtained. This (methodo)logically straightforward consequence of complexity is important because it satisfies the request that judgments about incommensurably diverse social matter are provided separately for each issue in its own incommensurable domain. Because of the complex nature of the social affairs, only partial synthesis is permitted in policy impact evaluation.

Partial aggregation obviously cannot resolve the aggregation problem, but only defines it appropriately for further considerations. It assures that in the research synthesis the oppositions that are based on value differences are aggregated in their own terms as a precondition for their indiscriminate interpretation from the perspective of the whole. Partial synthesis can be completed only to the point of forming three major oppositions to a public matter which is the object of evaluation. Exactly three oppositions are formed so that the illustration remains as simple as possible – but not oversimplified such as when policy priorities are set in a uniformly monistic or binary dualistic (either-or) way. When the major axes of opposition for evaluated social matter are revealed with partial aggregation, they can

be presented as a horizontal dimension of their complexity such as in a Leontief's input-output matrix (1970). This enables evaluator to exhibit, in a cross-sectional way, all relationships between the three incommensurable social oppositions. On non-diagonal fields of a matrix indirect or secondary policy impacts are identified. The secondary impact, for instance, shows how the implementation of evaluated economic measures impacts the conditions for achievement of social and environmental goals of the same policy and vice versa.

Secondary impacts are the foundation for a correlational synthesis of partially aggregated evaluation findings. Now the synthesis is no longer additive (as it was in the first step) but correlative or overlapping. It is only possible because its objects are not expressed categorically (as economic, social, environmental claims) but in a derivative sense of secondary importance (as weakly incommensurable, e.g. socio-economic, eco-social etc., as hybrid claims). Evaluation synthesis is therefore possible only for that part of evaluative findings which are not of primary importance for those who forward one of the three main categorical oppositions in the evaluation. The result of partial aggregation is intermediate and explains the result of evaluation of policy impact on three main representations of the common good (economic measures' impact on economic criteria, social impact on social criteria, etc). The result of the second step is different. It evaluates the degree of cohesion between secondary aspects of evaluation. The conclusion is that everything which can holistically be said about the overall impact of evaluated policy is derived from the evaluative findings that refer to matters which are only of secondary importance to those involved in the evaluation. From a viewpoint of an entire society and in normal conditions, no public policy priority can be primary for everyone but only for a minority – for the concrete policy-maker and for those directly affected. Therefore, in the society observed as a whole, a majority of the population experiences the majority of impacts of all policies as indirect or secondary impacts. This situates evaluator's concern for secondary impacts in the centre of policy evaluation studies.

The aggregation problem is therefore easily resolvable in the context of complexity with the two-stage or dual methodology of partial aggregation and matrical correlation. The dual approach is capable of producing cohesive meanings on a higher level of validity despite being instigated from contradictory starting points. The example shows that social complexity is not by itself acting against the possibility of relatively simple and cohesive reasoning about collective concerns.

When this is recognised in an approach to policy evaluation, the secondary perspective of “the other” is becoming a guideline for strategic judgment (Radej, 2011). This conclusion is well

ahead of the ambitions of prevailing evaluation practices which seem mostly content with evaluations based solely on analysis of primary effects of policies, such as its effectiveness on direct users, or even only its cost efficiency in monetary terms. However, the realization of the central importance of secondary meanings for explaining complex social phenomena is certainly original neither in social sciences nor in policy studies. Demsetz (1969, in Schnellenbach, 2005) claims that in a situation when there is no straightforward mechanism to install an optimal public policy, a policy proposal that is the most secondary effective ought to be chosen. As societies grow more complex, policy-makers should be increasingly aware not only of their own agency's primary aims and effectiveness, but also of wider implications and unwanted effects (secondary) of their (in)activity on wider society and its overall welfare. The particular policy maker must take into account the consequences of his or her efforts for 'the others', such as other policy-makers, to realise their primary demands which are often contradictory to primary demands of a particular policy-maker. Disregard for secondary impacts might explain why good individual policies, based on strong values and even on common sense, often lead to disappointing overall results (Chapman, 2004).

The importance of secondary effects in explaining social processes was evident already to Adam Smith, who built it into his key concept of the invisible hand of the market (which manages market processes behind our backs). In Hayek's theory of spontaneously extended order and in the work of economic evolutionists in general (Veblen, Schumpeter, Dopfer, Potts...), secondary interactions are crucial for explaining complex social processes. Hayek's source of order is an achievement of evaluation of a tacit (or dispersed, secondary) knowledge, which is in itself useless to individuals and becomes meaningful only in interaction with others (in the formation of equilibrium price on the market). When concretely analyzed, that, which seems of secondary meaning (namely influencing the others), validates itself as a key point for elaboration of the primary meaning (Althusser, in Levačić, 2009). Long before Hayek, Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote that those things which are for the public benefit are not a product of rationalist calculation. The happiness of a community is not promoted by trying to instill a passion for the public good in people, but by animating them with a 'spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury' so that the same result (public benefit) comes about indirectly (in Barry, 1982). Welfare of a community is therefore not achieved through the awakening of passions for creating public goods, but indirectly, by awakening of individual's passions for enterprise, art and leisure. Hayek says our intentions and actions are one thing, but their broader effect is something completely different. So the public welfare and common good are not direct materializations of politicians' efforts. The welfare is merely a coincidence of secondary effects which takes place behind our backs as a

combined consequence of actions and inactions of the government and all others. If men only did what they thought they were doing, the truth about society would be contained within a simple statement of their intentions. The idea that secondary issues are crucial in reasoning about social matters is also relevant to the thought of Popper, who takes the view that the unintended consequences of action are the principal concern of social science and that the existence of such consequences is a precondition for the very possibility of the scientific understanding of a complex society (Vernon, 1976).

Because of the above mentioned overlapping between evolutionary and complex explanations of the importance of secondary meanings for our understanding of complex social matters, a significant difference between them must immediately be emphasized. This difference is linked to the distinction, which needs to be kept, between linear and non-linear ways of reasoning about social matters. Evolutionary explanations, as non-linear, are entirely based on secondary meanings, but these are not sufficient to explain social matters in their complexity. Reducing explanations to secondary meanings is unacceptable; to substantiate this claim one needs to recall that social complexity is, after all, based on irreconcilable differences among categorical assertions. Classical evolutionists disregard this when they generalise about the importance of secondary processes and neglect the decisive role of deliberate efforts of subjects of social evolution in respect to their collective destiny. Evolutionary explanation is not a sufficient framework for elaborating social complexity because social processes can not be clarified without taking into account distinct discontinuities, the irreconcilable gaps which are caused by incommensurable social values and incommensurable scientific paradigms of knowledge. The society is not a convent, an undisturbed place from which all substantial dilemmas and deep contradictions are exiled. Just the opposite is the case. According to the system theorist and the Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon, mass societies would not exist without deep contradictions (Simon, 1969) which are, undoubtedly, deliberate and conscious, nor naturally essential neither simply spontaneous. Postmodern mass societies are possible only because they do not have a common core nor do they need to practice strong relationships which enable them to be internally linked and related not as converging similarities but as divergences – as discontinuities of autonomous sub-systems.

As shown by the dual approach to solving the aggregation problem in policy evaluation, every explanation of a complex social matter must equally seriously consider a large number of small consistencies (secondary view) and a small number of deep oppositions (primary view), to be able to explain a complex social matter without deformation and indiscriminately. *The realization that social matter has to be evaluated in a complex way simply means that it has*

to be evaluated in the golden ratio of its duality, stretched between the explanation of its primary meanings - which are constitutive for it, but in an incommensurable and deeply dividing way - and the explanation of its secondary meanings that are the only ones that lead to a holistic view, but merely in contents that are not of primary importance to anyone. Complex explanation of social reality is either divisive, when explained from the aspect of primary meanings or leads to dispersion, when approached from the secondary aspect.

But this does not mean that social reality is indeterminate. Emphasis on the key importance of secondary meanings for elaboration of complex social matters is not forwarded in isolation, but consistently appears in relation to the incommensurability of primary social matters. In explaining complex social matters the primary (linear) aspect and the secondary (non-linear) aspect are inseparably connected. Complex approach to a given social matter establishes a set of incommensurable relations (autonomies) between collective agents. They forward a non-exclusionary understanding of collective matters by forwarding the perspectives of 'the other' into collective affairs. This is needed if social autonomies persist in their aspirations to remain connected in a wider community, such as a nation. Improved understanding of social complexity in policy evaluation or, generally, in social research thus demands two tier approach. On one side it requires recognition of interdependence in weakly related secondary contents. On the other it demands recognition of independence in principal matters – these are always put forward uncompromisingly. This two step procedure which ensures balanced appreciation for primary and secondary qualities of social complexity is a relevant finding for our neo-liberal era, in which the conditions are reversed. The central importance in policy-making is now assigned to the rationality of free market which enhances secondary meanings, while the categorical and principal matters such as the conservation of nature, social justice and human rights are subordinate to overarching uniformity of market values.

Social complexity implies that in explanations of social fact there is a duality of relationship between the weak correlations and strong discontinuities among social entities. Granovetter (1983) similarly built his theory on a difference between strong and weak ties among community members. For him the weak (secondary) ties are of fundamental importance for social cohesion in conditions when the society is initially incommensurably divided. If all the links in a system were weak, as Hayek's theory anticipates, the system as a whole would be unstable, and its identity would soon be erased by external influences. An example of this is the consumer society which supplies a variety of differences (in products and services), but they grow increasingly meaningless. However, if all social ties were as strong as those existing in a family, club, between friends and in other examples of communities established

on the same common denominator (religion, nationality, science, ideology), then the society as a patchwork of such incommensurably homogeneous communities would be internally divided and would never be able to set itself as a coherent and functional whole.

Inherent duality in the evaluation of complex social matters leads to a multi-level exposition of relationships between rational perspectives of simplicity and complexity. A complex way of thinking does not eliminate the linear and simple way of thinking about social matters, but only confines it to simple problems. Simple questions are put either on the microscopic level of the individual or on the macroscopic level of a system as a whole. Social processes unravel both on the micro and on the macro levels, but the descriptions of the processes on these two levels cannot be directly linked – the social matters are vertically discontinuous and thus vertically complex. Microscopic matters are explained microscopically and macroscopic matters are explained macroscopically. In both cases a uniform way of thinking is used that is simple in a certain way. Both single level-based explanations of social matters are valid in their own incommensurable context, but they can be coherently explained together only from a third, middle or meso level (Dopfer et al., 2004) that shares the logic that is characteristic of both single-level aspects. Meso level is where the empirical collides with the conceptual and the individual with the collective (see Ostrom, 1990); on the meso level the institutions are at work; it is the level from which policies are generated and public dilemmas are evaluated. Thus at the meso level the ‘substrate of social’ is generated (Goldspink, 2000). So mesoscopic perspective is the imperative starting point for evaluating and managing public policy.

Therefore it is not wrong to think in a simple way about things expressed on a single level, as far as the interactions between these simplicities are done in a mesoscopic frame of the multi-level complexity. The conclusion is that the evaluation of complex social matters demands a meso rationality because it best fits the nature of the challenge. It produces a non-exclusionary perspective which expands the cognitive capabilities of society, so it can better comprehend the reality and its dilemmas. It appears that meso evaluations are a more valid approach in studying social complexity than the dominant positivist paradigm, and if so, they impose themselves on a higher level of generality as an independent rational framework for reasoning about social matters arising from an overlap between disputed but legitimate meanings.

For the indiscriminate inquiry into a constructed social reality, the meso evaluation seems to compare with the classical science in its efforts to obtain objective knowledge about externally imposed natural world. Theory of complexity implies that there is a multitude of realities (logics, paradigms) in existence, but this does not necessarily results in a confused

understanding of the real world. For example, even though the social reality revolves around entirely independent logic it is not entirely independent from objective reality; social reality imposes real consequences (moral, legal, economic) on its members, so it establishes its own distinctive type of objectivity.

When observed from the meso perspective, fundamental disunity on the level of social sub-systems is not an obstacle for a more holistic understanding of complex social matters. Diversity on the deep level is arising from agents' quest for more autonomy; this can not be seen as a misfortune endangering the possibility of achieving a sort of unity in the postmodern society. On the contrary, deep oppositions and resulting disunity are only a consequence of the fact that members of the society respond self-protectively in various original ways to the increased mutual interdependence, leading to a decrease in their autonomy. However, their self protective strategies are all motivated for the achievement of one or the other form of commonality. The genuine challenge for the postmodern society is to consistently link the multitude of these endeavours.

The preservation of incommensurable oppositions is of fundamental importance for the resolution of complex social dilemmas. What is needed for the future is to cultivate deep social oppositions instead of making an effort to consensually exceed them, to alleviate them by compromising or simply disregard them out of ignorance or through exclusion. Of course, the preservation of deep oppositions does not create a cohesive society, but only re-establishes the conditions for its creation. For example, most of hybrid eco-social, eco-business, socially-enterprising projects – which are source of plural social cohesion – thrive in the countries, where legitimate categorical demands, in their broadest range of oppositions, are indiscriminately respected not only in the free market entrepreneurship, but also in the concerns for a clean and healthy environment, and where high standards of social security are also preserved.

Aspirations for a more integral view of the multi-polar postmodern society will cultivate a *non-exclusionary disagreement* as a new form of expression of deep social oppositions. Although the differences in values are irreconcilable, the viewpoints based on them are not antagonistic, but only incommensurable. These oppositions are agonistic, i.e. provocative, and not exclusive ones (Foucault, in Burchell et al., 1991). According to the French philosopher Chantal Mouffe, the postmodern values will never be able to resolve deep social conflicts. Neither it is possible to apply any standard frame for their settlement and reconciliation. The only feasible frame is a non-standardised one which emerges among participating agents in their concrete situation and context as their jointly inventive construct. To create such a

unique frame it is, in the first place, necessary to establish a democratic atmosphere 'where the achievement is not a consensus but a relationship' (Mouffe, 1999). Or, as she states elsewhere, the 'main task of democracy is not achieving consensus but managing discord through mutual respect' (Mouffe, 2010). The task of democracy is therefore precisely to establish the possibility to see its own construction of the social reality in the perspective of "the other" (Ankersmit, 2005).

Distinguishing primary meanings from the secondary ones is a precondition for an unbiased explanation of a complex social matter, because it preserves its internal disunity without endangering its external unity. Complex evaluation of social matters will undoubtedly open front doors to possibility of expressing deep social opposites. This will ensure a significant increase in the extent of social conflicts in the future. However, the deep opposites will be presented in their plural midleness and so expressed in a much more cultivated way than presently. Principally balanced deliberation of social conflicts will enable us to transform the destructiveness of social conflicts and their rationale of exclusion into a constructive force of overlapping cooperation. In this way the descendant of postmodern society would become much more conflicted in a much more constructive way.

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»Meso-Matrical Synthesis of the Incommensurable« (B. Radej, 21 str.)	3/2008
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